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South African companies in financial distress may file for business rescue in terms of Chapter 6 of the 
South African Companies Act No. 71 of 2008. The Companies Act (RSA 2008:s150[b][vi]) requires, 
among other things, that an appointed business rescue practitioner (BRP) prepare a business rescue 
plan to show the benefit of adopting the business rescue plan as an alternative to immediate 
liquidation. The business rescue plan should indicate to the creditors that a company is worth more 
‘alive’ than ‘dead’. In other words, that if the creditors file for immediate liquidation, they will receive 
less than they would receive through a reorganisation (in South Africa [SA] referred to as a business 
rescue) (Altman & Hotchkiss 2006:8). Thus, showing the benefits in the form of a valuation of the 
company in business rescue becomes a vital aspect of a restructuring process, since the estimated 
value of the company determines the size of the pie to be divided between the creditors and, if 
possible, the shareholders (Altman & Hotchkiss 2006:103; Harvey 2011:181; TMA-US 2016:202).
A value uncertainty in practice
According to Practice Note 1 of the Turnaround Management Association (TMA) of SA, the BRP 
should, while preparing the liquidation value, also prepare a draft business rescue distribution 
value based on preliminary assumptions and scenarios for the business rescue plan (Migwalla 
2017). A Gauteng High Court judgement showed that the court was uncertain how a BRP could 
obtain a better market value for assets in business rescue than a liquidator (Bradstreet 2013:45). 
It is precisely this uncertainty that is the aim of this article, namely how the BRP determines the 
business rescue value of a financially distressed South African company for inclusion in the 
business rescue plan.
Background: A business rescue plan should indicate the benefits of adopting a business rescue 
plan as opposed to the benefits of immediate liquidation. Performing a valuation is thus a vital 
aspect of the business rescue process as the estimated values determine the amount to be 
divided between creditors and, if possible, shareholders. Conventional valuation methods 
have the underlying assumption that the business is a going concern (based on liquidy and 
solvency tests). However, a company in business rescue is not necessarily a going concern, nor 
in liquidation, leaving the company in a grey area in terms of valuation.
Aim: This research explored how the business rescue value of a financially distressed company 
is determined.
Setting: The setting for this study was South Africa.
Method: Thematic analysis of qualitative data collected through 11 semi-structured interviews 
with senior business rescue practitioners (BRPs).
Results: When the intention is to return the company to solvency, the BRPs prepared a 
short-term, undiscounted cash flow budget to determine the business rescue value, but 
without including a terminal value in the projected cash flows. In contrast, when the intention 
is to obtain a better return compared to immediate liquidation, BRPs follow an asset approach 
to determine the business rescue value. The results also showed that the business, digital and 
relational acumen of the BRP is a major influencer in the business rescue value.
Conclusion: The financial elements identified and substantiated in this study may serve as 
best practice guidance in the business rescue industry and lead to an expansion of the existing 
valuation theory.
Keywords: Business rescue practitioner; business rescue value; Chapter 6; Companies Act; 
financial distress; going concern; liquidation; valuation.
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When a business goes into financial distress, valuation 
becomes a complicated matter, one that has not yet been 
comprehensively analysed (Crystal & Mokal 2006:1; Hrdý & 
Simek 2012:121, 131). Conventional valuation techniques are 
available to the BRP. However, Damodaran (2009:11) states 
that analysts often find that the tools and approaches that 
served them adequately for healthy companies do not hold 
in a distress scenario. The problem is even worse in a sector 
with a history of financial distress, since analysts are often 
slow to let go of old rules of thumb (ROT) and metrics 
(Damodaran 2009:11).
The two business rescue avenues
In SA, the Companies Act allows for two possible outcomes 
from a business rescue. In simple terms, Goal 1 refers to an 
instance in which a company is restructured (or revitalised) in 
order to continue as a going concern on a solvent basis, while 
Goal 2 requires that creditors receive a better return as 
compared to immediate liquidation (RSA 2008:s128[1][b] [iii]). 
A BRP may achieve a better return under Goal 2 through 
either selling the assets of the company as a functioning unit 
to another party or through a controlled wind-down of assets 
(Harvey 2011:182). Loubser (2013:448) submitted that one 
cannot assume that selling a company as a going concern in 
business rescue would always result in a higher return than 
selling assets in a break-up sale. Even if one assumes that a 
better price can be obtained when selling a going concern in 
business rescue, business rescue costs such as practitioner 
fees and employee remuneration may erode the benefit, and 
the company could just as well have gone into liquidation 
straight away. To complicate matters, the BRP is also under 
tremendous time pressure to publish the business rescue 
plan (Pretorius 2016:491; RSA 2008:s150), as there is a 
negative correlation between the time that elapses and the 
asset value in a distressed company (Rajaram, Singh & 
Sewpersadh 2018). It may therefore not be possible to perform 
a comprehensive valuation of the company using the 
conventional valuation techniques.
Defining the term business rescue value
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford 2017), the 
word ‘benefit’ means an advantage or profit gained from 
something. The word benefit may, therefore, include both 
monetary and non-monetary advantages or gains. This is 
also applicable in business rescue as the benefit of business 
rescue goes beyond the monetary benefit that may be 
available to the creditors. For example, it will also include the 
benefit that a successfully completed business rescue will, 
under Goal 1, prevent job losses (Conradie & Lamprecht 
2018; Loubser 2010:560; Marsden & Laher 2018). The non-
monetary elements of business rescue success have been 
sufficiently researched; therefore, this research focuses on the 
monetary benefit of business rescue. Throughout this article, 
the authors used the term business rescue value, which refers 
to the value (monetary benefit) determined as the alternative 
to immediate liquidation.
Research aim, question and objective
To address the problem of conventional valuation methods 
that may not be applicable in a business rescue scenario, the 
research aim of this article is to establish how the BRP 
determines the business rescue value of a financially 
distressed South African company. The aim is addressed by 
answering the following research question: In business 
rescue, what valuation approach does the BRP use to 
determine the business rescue value? In order to answer the 
research question, the research objective is to determine the 
valuation approaches used by a BRP under Goal 1 and Goal 2 
of a business rescue.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: a 
literature review is provided, followed by the research 
methodology and presentation of the findings. Thereafter, 
the authors provide a summary of the findings with author 
recommendations. The article concludes with limitations of 
the research, possibilities for future research and an overall 
conclusion.
Literature review
In a distressed setting, the objective is usually to value the 
enterprise as a whole, as opposed to only the equity (Altman 
& Hotchkiss 2006:105). The term ‘reorganisation value’ is 
often used in international commentary in such an instance. 
Reorganisation value is the fair value of the entity before 
considering liabilities and approximates the amount a willing 
buyer would pay for the assets of the entity immediately 
after the restructuring (AICPA 1990:19, 273, 295). The United 
States of America (USA) were the first to start with a modern 
business rescue regime (Rajak & Henning 1999:263). The 
USA Bankruptcy Code is divided into various chapters, of 
which Chapter 11 contains the provisions for reorganisation. 
Being the leading legislation in reorganisations, one would 
expect that Chapter 11 would clearly define reorganisation 
value. However, Steffen (2016:14) noted that reorganisation 
value is not defined explicitly in the USA, although the 
reorganisation value is determined primarily by discounting 
future cash flows for the reformed business (that will emerge 
from Chapter 11 of the USA Bankruptcy Code), plus the 
anticipated income from the sale of assets not required in the 
reconstituted business.
The South African Companies Act does not require the 
business rescue plan to include a valuation of equity and, 
therefore, the review below focuses on the main valuation 
techniques available in valuation theory, with which to value 
a company (enterprise as a whole). The three main valuation 
approaches include an income, relative (or multiple) and 
asset (or cost) approach.
Income approach
A significant technique under the income approach is the 
free cash flow to firm technique (FCFF). The FCFF is 
forward-looking and focuses on future operating cash flows, 
discounted to a present value using an appropriate discount 
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rate to take the time value of money (TVM) into account 
(Altman & Hotchkiss 2006:109; Damodaran 2013:7; Harvey 
2011:183; TMA-SA 2016:145). This technique has two main 
underlying expectations, namely that the company will be a 
going concern and that the company will generate profits for 
some time in the future (Buttignon 2015:6; TMA-SA 2016:152). 
The latter requires a terminal value, calculated by either 
using a multiple of revenues (usually derived from healthy, 
publicly traded firms) (Damodaran 2009:31), the Gordon 
growth model or, if it is a deteriorating or finite-lived asset 
that is valued, the salvage value of the asset (IVSC 2016:43). 
In SA, under usual business circumstances, valuators tend to 
use the income approach to value a going-concern company 
(PwC 2017). The study conducted by PwC (2017), however, 
did not prescribe the approach to use under business rescue 
circumstances.
Alternative valuation techniques to consider under the 
income approach are the adjusted present value (APV) 
technique and the modified discounted cash flow (MDCF) 
technique. The APV might be useful in complicated tax 
situations and during significant changes in the capital 
structure (Altman & Hotchkiss. 2006:113; Poniachek 2010; 
TMA-SA 2016:151). The MDCF technique may also be useful 
as it separates a going-concern value and a value that emerges 
from the effects of distress (Damodaran 2006:15; TMA-SA 
2016:152).
Relative (or multiple) approach
The relative (or multiple) approach uses a comparative company 
or industry average or multiple (e.g. profit after tax times 4 
equals company value) as a proxy to determine a value for a 
specific company. Aspects to consider when searching for a 
peer group multiple include variables such as revenue, earnings, 
customers, product mix, distribution channels and financial 
leverage (TMA-SA 2016:157). The lack of comparable entities 
might, however, hinder the estimation of a peer group multiple 
(Crystal & Morkal 2006:8; Harvey 2011:187). Furthermore, the 
company in financial distress will probably have negative cash 
flows and profits, which will result in a negative value. Beyond 
the difficulties of finding the proxy multiple, the usefulness of 
historical data for the firm is limited when the firm undergoes 
significant asset restructuring (Altman & Hotchkiss 2006:106). 
Under usual business circumstances, PwC (2017:54) found 
that of all the different multiples available, the market value of 
invested capital, divided by earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation (MVIC/EBITDA) multiple, is 
the most frequently used multiple in order to value a 
going-concern entity in practice.
Asset (cost) approach
The final main valuation approach considered, is 
the asset-based valuation, also known as the cost approach 
(IVSC 2016:45; PwC 2017:30). This approach is not typically 
used to value a company or business as a whole (IVSC 
2016:54) although the cost approach is often used as a 
reasonableness check to confirm that the going-concern 
value is more than the liquidation value (IVSC 2016:45). 
Under the asset approach, a valuator may use different 
valuation techniques. Three of the most common techniques 
are replacement cost, reproduction cost and the 
summation (sum of the parts) method (IVSC 2016:46–48). It 
is important to note that the carrying value (alternatively 
referred to as the book value) of assets as per financial 
statements is typically cost price, less accumulated 
depreciation and accumulated impairment losses. This 
carrying value may thus not be the same as the realisable 
value (IVSC 2016:46–47).
Summary of conventional valuation approaches 
and techniques 
Before considering other valuation considerations in the South 
African context, a summary of the conventional valuation 
approaches and the main valuation techniques, identified 
from the literature is provided (Figure 1). The findings of the 
study will be contrasted against the conventional valuation 
approaches and techniques indicated in Figure 1.
Other valuation considerations
Besides the specific valuation approach and technique used 
to value a company, other qualitative factors may also 
influence the valuation of a financially distressed company in 
business rescue.
Who determines the business rescue value?
In a valuation, the different parties (e.g. the shareholders, 
managers, the BRP and creditors) might have different needs 
and bargaining power (Correia et al. 2015:6–2; PwC 2017:17). 
This might lead to an agency problem (Jensen & Mechling 
1976). Internationally, under pre-pack asset sales, assets are 
usually valued by company management or an independent 
valuator (Mkondo & Pretorius 2017:104, 116). The conflicting 
interest between various role players of distressed firms might, 
however, result in valuation errors ranging from less than 20% 
to greater than 250% (Gilson, Hotchkiss & Ruback 2000:70).
MVIC/EBITDA, market value of invested capital divided by earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation; ROT, rules of thumb; FCF, free cash flow; APV, adjusted 
present value; MDCF, modified discounted cash flow.
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Time value of money
Time value of money should be explicitly considered in the 
valuation of distressed companies because reorganisations 
may take several years (Altman & Hotchkiss 2006:8; Reilly 
2013:13). The TVM is reflected in the discount rate. However, 
determining the cost of capital components (e.g. the cost of 
debt, cost of equity, debt-equity ratio) and resulting weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) discount rate might be 
difficult (TMA-US 2016:212). The average expected business 
rescue period for South African companies is 16 months 
(Klokow 2018:7). One would, therefore, expect the BRP to 
consider the TVM, given that people prefer to receive money 
sooner rather than later (Adriaanse & Van der Rest 2017:104).
South African context
The reader should note that the theory in this section was 
drawn from the work of various international researchers, 
for example Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), Damodaran 
(2009), Reilly (2013) and TMA-US (2016). It is important to 
note that these researchers were writing primarily from the 
point of view espoused in the USA (Chapter 11 of the USA 
Bankruptcy Code). An important difference between 
business rescue in SA (Chapter 6) and business rescue in the 
USA is that a company does not have to be in financial 
distress to file for Chapter 11 protection, whereas, in SA, a 
company must be in financial distress in order to do so. 
Chapter 6 is also the only legislation, when compared to the 
USA, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia, that 
includes a strict definition of financial distress, namely that 
within the following six months, the company will be unable 
to pay its debts or the company’s liabilities will exceed its 
assets (Lamprecht 2016:113).
Theoretical perspective
Within a constructivist ontology, and taking an inductive 
interpretive approach to understanding the nature of 
valuations in a business rescue context, two main 
theories were used to guide the research, namely agency 
theory and information asymmetry. Firstly, agency theory is 
a well-known theory that describes the relationship in which 
one or more persons (the principal) engages with another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on the principal’s 
behalf. This may involve delegating a degree of 
decision-making power to the agent. However, within 
agency theory, an agency problem may occur when the 
parties to the relationship have different goals (Jensen & 
Mechling 1976). An agency problem often occurs between 
the shareholders and management of a company, as well as 
between the shareholders and providers of finance (Correia 
et al. 2015). In the context of business rescue, Pillay, Rajaram 
and Ramnanun (2020) argued that because agency theory 
describes the affiliation between agents (BRPs) and principals 
(the companies they assist), business rescue falls within the 
agency theory. Pretorius (2016:483) agrees that an agency 
problem exists between the various role players (shareholders, 
BRPs and creditors) in business rescue, due to the different 
degrees of the risk appetite of these role players. Shareholders’ 
influence over the choice of supervisor might be limited, 
shareholders will not be able to vote on the proposed plan 
unless their rights are amended, and even then may find 
their opposition to a plan, that is supported by the creditors, 
ignored. The prevailing view is that shareholders in a 
company rescue are mainly onlookers, although they may be 
the ones who will lose everything (Loubser 2008:389). Also, it 
is impossible to say with any certainty whether the legislature 
considered the fact that directors could also be employees of 
the company and thus be entitled to the special rights, powers 
and super preferences that are given to employees in business 
rescue proceedings. In the absence of any provision, clearly 
excluding executive directors from being regarded as 
employees, it must be assumed that they have all the rights, 
powers and benefits that any other employees have during 
business rescue proceedings, even if that position may lead 
to abuse of the process or have other undesirable consequences 
(Joubert & Loubser 2016).
Secondly, and following from the agency theory, is that 
classic agency theory also assumes the existence of equal 
information to the principals and agents (Pretorius 2016). In 
his seminal paper, Akerlof (1970), explains the theory of 
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers in 
relation to the value of a product. In the context of business 
rescue, Pretorius (2016), Levenstein (2015) and Deloitte (2017) 
confirmed the existence of information asymmetry.
In this article, the authors use agency theory as a lens to 
consider whether the BRP is acting for its own benefit, for the 
benefit of the shareholder, or maybe even for the creditor. 
Furthermore, the theory of information asymmetry is used to 
consider what information is shared between the BRP and 




Research studies are influenced by the beliefs, values and 
philosophical assumptions of the researchers. The ontology 
of the researchers was that of constructivism, with the 
research participants and their subjective views forming the 
researchers’ understanding of the research phenomena. 
Within this context, the research participants provided their 
own understanding and ascribed meanings shaped by their 
interactions with others and from their own personal 
histories. The research findings in this instance are shaped 
from individual perspectives to broad patterns and, 
eventually, to broad understandings (Creswell & Plano Clark 
2011:40).
Research approach
In view of the limited body of research on valuations in a 
South African business rescue context, the research approach 
was of an exploratory, qualitative nature. A semi-structured 
interview method was used to obtain the views of 11 senior 
BRPs. Given the topic of valuations, the respondents were 
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purposefully selected (Rowley 2012:264) to include mainly 
individuals with a financial background. The remainder of 
the sample was selected from boutique consulting firms, 
based on seniority and experience in the business rescue field 
(e.g. someone who led high-profile business rescues in SA or 
someone recognised as a leader in the industry by their 
peers). The selection process resulted in most of the research 
participants being senior BRPs, having an accounting 
background and registered with at least one of the major 
accounting bodies (Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants [CIMA], South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants [SAICA] and South African Institute of 
Professional Accountants [SAIPA]).
The literature review was used to prepare an interview 
agenda for the study. The interview agenda was pilot tested 
(Bryman 2012:185) to ensure the questions were clear and 
relevant, and that they addressed the research question 
(Rowley 2012:265). The pilot testing was followed by semi-
structured, one-on-one interviews with individual BRPs. As 
suggested by Rowley (2012:265), the interviews were 
conducted in person. The semi-structured interviews 
permitted a degree of flexibility (King & Horrocks 2010), and 
BRPs had the opportunity to share information about their 
personal beliefs, experiences and actions, which may not 
have been possible if a rigid schedule of questions had been 
used (Stone 2015:259). When needed, the researcher asked 
additional questions in direct response to the statements 
made by the interviewee (Bryman 2012:471). The researcher 
conducted the interviews until data saturation occurred 
(Guest, Bunce & Johnson 2006:59). In this study, data 
saturation was reached after 10 interviews, with an 11th 
interview as the concluding interview. The interviews took 
between 48 and 85 min, with an average length of 60 min. 
The number and length of the interviews were deemed to be 
sufficient, compared to a recommended six to eight interviews 
of 1 hour each (Rowley 2012:263).
All interviews were audio-recorded. In addition to the audio 
recordings, the interviewer also made written notes during 
and shortly after each interview, based on personal reflections 
in relation to important statements and observations (Ritchie 
et al. 2013:297; Rowley 2012:266). Subsequent to each 
interview, a professional transcriber transcribed the audio 
recordings in order to prepare the audio data for computer-
assisted analysis (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011:205). Atlas.ti 
was used to code the transcriptions and personal notes into 
key themes, concepts and ideas using an inductive mode of 
reasoning (Bryman 2012:404). An immersion approach (Stone 
2015:259) was used through direct engagement with the 
coding and thematic analysis process. This involved 
repeatedly replaying the audio recordings and revisiting the 
transcripts and notes made during the interviews. The 
researchers were aware that a theme might be unique to one 
interviewee’s account (King & Horrocks 2010). After coding 
all the interviews, Atlas.ti was used to group specific codes 
together to form conceptual frameworks based on common 
themes identified from the different interviews. This rigorous 
thematic analysis process of data familiarisation, data coding, 
theme development and revision (Creswell & Plano Clark 
2011:205), provided the necessary rich information and 
findings in order to achieve the research objectives and to 
answer the research questions.
Researcher bias can be a factor in qualitative research such as 
interviews (Rowley 2012) and threaten the reliability of data. 
In this study, the researcher ensured that only experienced 
interviewees were chosen, that the interview agenda was 
appropriately designed and tested and that a thorough 
analysis of the data was performed, resulting in reasonable 
assurance of the reliability and validity of findings (Creswell 
& Plano Clark. 2011; Rowley 2012). To ensure the 
trustworthiness of the research, that is, credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985), the researchers employed the following process. 
The credibility of the findings was ensured by site 
triangulation (Shenton 2004:66) and by selecting participants 
from several organisations and different provinces. To ensure 
transferability, the researcher provided a ‘thick description’ 
of both the participants and the study’s context (Lincoln & 
Guba 1985). An in-depth methodological description 
enhanced dependability (Shenton 2004:73), while the secure 
storage of all the notes, transcripts and audio recordings 
ensured the confirmability of the findings (Milne & Oberle 
2005:416).
Ethical considerations 
This article followed all ethical standards for carrying out 
research. Stellenbosch University approved the study with 
ethical clearance number: ACC-2018-6328.
Findings
Interviewees indicated that a single business rescue plan 
might include a combination of Goal 1 (continue to exist) and 
Goal 2 (BRIL) proposals, especially if it is a business rescue of 
a large entity. It is important that the reader keeps in mind 
the fundamental difference between a Goal 1 and a Goal 2 
business rescue because the research found that the goal 
affects the valuation approach followed by the BRP. The next 
section presents the valuation techniques used under a 
Goal 1 scenario.
Valuation techniques used to determine the 
business rescue value under Goal 1: Returning 
the legal entity to solvency
The study found that under a Goal 1 scenario, participants 
deem traditional valuations according to valuation theory 
irrelevant. In order to present a business rescue value in the 
plan, the BRP will, after performing a critical trading analysis 
of the distressed company, prepare a cash flow projection, 
which will usually be for only 3 years, unless there are 
compelling reasons that require longer cash flow budgets. 
Company management will assist with the cash flow 
projection only if the BRP is satisfied that management is 
competent to do so. However, interviewees indicated that 
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management is often incompetent in preparing proper cash 
flow budgets. The study revealed that BRPs did not discount 
the projected cash flows to account for the TVM; neither did 
the BRPs calculate a terminal value for the business. Their 
aim was to ascertain when, and how much cash will be 
available to creditors from the ongoing trade of the company, 
in order to provide a reasonable return to both old and new 
creditors:
‘Typically that valuation on the outcome is just a pure maths 
calculation, it says there’s R5 000 a month for 60 months. It’s not 
so much a valuation as just an exercise in really crunching the 
numbers, and it’s the free cash flow part, before the discounting 
if you work it out, but very granular.’ (BRP9, July 2018, chartered 
accountant)
The statement above indicates that the valuation is not a 
genuine valuation but rather a possible valuation which the 
BRP needs to achieve to proceed with business rescue. To 
incorporate risk in the valuation calculation, some BRPs 
indicated that they use scenario analysis and provide a high 
and low valuation scenario in the plan, while the majority do 
not provide different scenarios in the plan:
‘I give two scenarios, business rescue and liquidation, which one 
do you want.’ (BRP5, June 2018, chartered accountant)
It is important to manage the expectations of the creditors, 
and thus, the BRPs preferred to be conservative, by using the 
lower or average range of values when preparing cash flow 
forecasts:
‘Under promising and over-delivering rather than the converse.’ 
(BRP5, June 2018, chartered accountant)
To continue trading, the financially distressed company 
may require a new equity partner in order to obtain 
post-commencement finance (PCF). Although BRP10 had 
obtained an independent valuation from an independent 
auditing firm for the equity value of a distressed company once, 
the majority of the BRPs indicated that a business in rescue 
generally has a negative equity value. Thus, BRPs can usually 
only work with the offers they receive from potential investors:
‘You are going to work with what you have. Regardless of the 
value of the business, you [the new investor] are going to want the 
lion share. You [the new investor] are going to say listen, I will put 
in 50 bobs, but I am going to take 60%. This business’s value two 
years ago was sitting at, you know, a billion. How can you expect 
to … I say well, take it or leave it. There is a sanity check 
calculation in the background that might give you an idea of 
what equity value is, but in most cases, a business in rescue has 
negative equity.’ (BRP6, July 2018, business administrator)
The above statement shows the negative effect that the lack 
of PCF (Du Preez 2013) has on the business rescue value. 
Because of the dependency on private investor capital, the 
bargaining power to negotiate a high equity value is 
limited. It also highlights the agency problem as identified 
by Pretorius (2016), as a BRP will sometimes need to accept 
PCF from a private investor, in return for an equity stake, 
just to save the company’s operations (and employment). 
The BRP (agent) therefore focused on saving the business 
operations, and not necessarily on retaining current 
ownership of the shareholders (principals).
One interviewee, BRP7, follows a specific recipe when pursuing 
Goal 1 with a new equity partner. During a critical trading 
analysis of the financially distressed company, BRP7 would 
investigate current expenses line by line on the company’s trial 
balance and be ruthless in cutting costs. They believe that, if an 
operating leverage of 20% exists (i.e. the difference between the 
company’s old and new cost structure), the business may be 
saved in terms of Goal 1. It is then important to establish how 
much working capital the company needs to keep on trading 
and to consequently find a funding partner for the required 
working capital. The funding partner will then, in return, receive 
an equity stake in the company. Figure 2 is an example of a 
standard PCF agreement used by BRP7 when selling shares 
under business rescue to a new equity partner.
From Figure 2, the ability of the BRP to critically analyse the 
short-term cash flow needs of the company in detail is 
evident. This critical analysis of future cash inflows and 
outflows will determine both the PCF, as well as the business 
rescue value of the company (the higher the PCF, the higher 
the business rescue value). Also, it is important to note that 
the business rescue value under Goal 1 will be fluent: it is not 
an exact value that is determined, because the business rescue 
value represents in essence the potential cash that the 
business will generate over a specified time period.
Previous literature confirms that SARS has a preferent claim 
in liquidation but a concurrent claim in business rescue 
(Werksmans 2012). Business rescue practitioners indicated 
that during the pre-assessment of the company, the voting 
percentage of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) is a 
‘game-changer’ in respect of the business rescue value: 
‘If SARS has more than 25% voting interest, then at the meeting 
they are going to have a swing vote. So, where you guys want to 
value the company, I’m valuing the [SARS] vote. If yes [SARS’s 
vote is more than 25%], we look at the liquidation calculation. If 
SARS is going to get 70 cents in liquidation, then, using the free 
cash flow method, I have to pay all the concurrent creditors the 
same [in business rescue], even if they are getting zero cents [in 
Source: Adapted from BRP7, July 2018, professional accountant.
PCF, post-commencement finance.
FIGURE 2: Post-commencement finance agreement when selling shares to a 
new equity partner.
• New equity partner buys 51% shares in the financially distressed company
   at a price of R1 for each share.
• New equity partner is required to invest PCF equal to 3 to 6 months'
   working capital need (e.g. property and labour costs for six months).
• Financially distressed company pays PCF back to new equity partner
   over three years, with the prime interest rate applying on the PCF.
• Aer a three-year period, the original shareholders will buy back
   the new equity partner's 51% shareholding at a PE-rao of 3.
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liquidation]. I have to go for 70 cents, so that I can win SARS in 
court. Then I put that in my cash flow model, and then I work out 
a value.’ (BRP7, July 2018, professional accountant) 
In summary, the results of this section stand in contrast to 
previous literature. Although the FCFF valuation technique 
was preferred in determining the reorganisation value under 
international legislation such as Chapter 11 of the USA 
Bankruptcy Code (Altman & Hotchkiss. 2006; Steffen 2016), 
and in ordinary business practice in SA (PwC 2017), the FCFF 
was not used by BRPs to determine the business rescue value. 
Instead, BRPs determined the business rescue value by using 
a short-term (3 years) cash flow budget, without the inclusion 
of a terminal value for the business. In addition, although it 
was expected that the BRP would consider the TVM 
(Adriaanse & van der Rest. 2017; Altman & Hotchkiss 2006; 
Reilly 2013; TMA-US 2016), the findings indicated that BRPs 
used undiscounted cash flows. Furthermore, the position of 
SARS was identified as a significant influencer of future 
projected cash flows and, therefore, the business rescue value.
Valuation techniques used to determine the 
business rescue value under Goal 2: Sale of business
As indicated earlier, two scenarios exist under Goal 2 (Harvey 
2011:182). The first scenario is to pursue the sale of the 
business as a functioning unit. When a financially distressed 
business is sold (either as a group or as separate divisions), it 
involves a cash transaction and, according to the interviewees, 
valuations would typically be more relevant in this instance. 
In a Goal 1 return to solvency scenario, where a definite 
possibility of returning the business to solvency exists, a 
liquidator would not be able to perform the task, as a 
liquidator’s task is to close down a business and sell the 
assets. However, when considering Goal 2 of business rescue, 
it becomes more of a grey area – this is where one would be 
able to argue that either a BRP or a liquidator would be able 
to sell a company or its assets. There is a fine line between use 
and abuse of the business rescue procedure (Bradstreet 2013), 
and the authors believe that it is the availability of this 
secondary goal of the legislation that opens up the door for 
abuse. It is therefore actually only under Goal 2 where one 
can really compare BRPs with liquidators.
The business rescue value is collectively determined by 
certain role players. Table 1 indicates some of the main role 
players in business rescue and their roles in determining the 
business rescue value. The table also shows the number of 
interviewees that mentioned that particular role.
It is evident from Table 1 that, ultimately, the buyer 
determines the price of the transaction. Participants indicated 
that the BRP might perform a high-level valuation of the 
company solely to determine whether the offers that come in 
are reasonable:
‘I was a partner at firm X [a large audit firm], so I know how to 
do a valuation, and I’ve done many valuation advisory 
engagements, and sell-side mandates and buy-side mandates 
and various things, and that whole normal world doesn’t 
apply, because anybody who is buying a distressed business 
says it’s in trouble, it’s failed. You can say it failed because the 
owner bought a Ferrari with the money; it is not the business’s 
mistake. They [the buyers] say no, then they push you down. 
So when you talk valuation techniques, I mean, we do them to 
get an idea, but the value is what a willing buyer is prepared 
to pay full stop.’ (BRP9, July 2018, chartered accountant)
According to interviewees, buyers do not usually disclose 
their valuation techniques and underlying assumptions, 
although BRPs are able to ascertain, from the bids coming in, 
that buyers tend to focus on the value of tangible assets. In 
SA, when companies file for business rescue, the level of 
financial distress is already so bad that, according to BRP1, 
there is not much ‘oxygen left in the tank’. As a result, the 
financially distressed company does not have either much 
time or the bargaining power in the selling process as in a 
typical corporate transaction. Since buyers buy the company 
assets as a functioning unit, the asset value is the value-in-use, 
as opposed to the liquidation value of the assets. However, 
buyers still tend to push the price down as low as possible 
and, in practice, participants experienced that even tangible 
assets take a haircut:
‘There are deep, deep discounts that come in as a result of the 
fact that the business is in rescue and in distress. Let me give you 
an idea. To build Company H from scratch today would cost you 
R7 billion, but the bid that we got, the value of that bid, was 
R1.75 billion.’ (BRP6, July 2018, business administrator)
TABLE 1: Roles within the business rescue valuation process.
Role Finding Number of 
occurrences
Buyer Determines the value of the offer. 10
Looks mainly at the value of assets. 7
Seeks heavily discounted price. 5
Trade buyers and financial buyers have different valuations. 3
Does not disclose the valuation technique or underlying assumptions. 4
Business rescue  
practitioner
Facilitates the bidding process with the help of an independent advisor where applicable. 10
Performs instinctual valuation using industry pricing models. This involves a combination of discounted cash flows or earnings multiples 
on profitable businesses, the book value or insurance value of assets, and calculating an embedded value for a financial services company. 
The business rescue practitioner uses this value solely as a sanity check against bids.
10
Compares offers received from buyers with the help of independent transaction advisors where applicable. 10
Compares offers to liquidation value (and controlled wind-down value where applicable). 10
Management Makes company information available to business rescue practitioner. 11
Creditors Vote on offers in the business rescue plan. 11
Court No involvement in determining the value of the sale. 11
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A strong theme identified from the data was that investors 
investing in financially distressed companies do not pay for the 
future earnings potential of the company. The value of the 
company comes down to an asset valuation approach, and BRPs 
does not separately value the intangible assets of the company:
‘So, if you’re in a retail operation and you have a bad retailer 
getting bought by a good retailer, he’s going to give you value 
for the inventory, on the assumption that you haven’t bought too 
badly – you’re not sitting on jerseys in summer or costumes in 
winter – and possibly a value for the lease. Because if you got 
prime real estate in an area, that is a key component. However, 
the ability to turn that store into a profitable store, using his 
intellectual property, he is not going to pay you for as well. So 
you generally see asset value, plus a very, very small goodwill 
component coming out of it in terms of that.’ (BRP5, June 2018, 
chartered accountant)
Business rescue practitioner 11 confirmed that in the retail 
industry, the value would be asset-based and possibly an 
earnings multiple, but on far smaller multiples than one would 
see in a traditional going-concern business, and particularly 
given the risk that’s associated with business rescue. As 
indicated by the examples above, there is a good potential of 
investing in a financially distressed company in SA, as 
investors obtain operating companies with all intangible assets 
attached to it, at bargain prices. At the same time, it set realistic 
sale expectations for both creditors and shareholders.
Table 1 indicated that the BRP facilitates communications with 
potential buyers of the financially distressed business. Goal 2 of 
business rescue allows for a return just above liquidation; 
therefore, the liquidation value sets the first valuation benchmark. 
The liquidation value is thus a critical piece of information that 
can lead to both an agency problem and information asymmetry 
between role players. The majority of BRPs indicated that the 
liquidation value is usually independently determined. This is a 
control that is put in place by BRPs, although not required by the 
Companies Act. Some BRPs indicated that they did not give the 
liquidation value to potential buyers, although other BRPs did 
provide the liquidation value to potential bidders. Business 
rescue practitioners state that they do not give the liquidation 
value to prevent potential bidders from exploiting the system 
(BRP5, BRP6).
The above example indicates that BRPs (agents) do act in 
the best interest of shareholders (principals) and creditors, 
in the sense that they try to obtain the highest possible 
value from buyers by not disclosing the liquidation value. 
Although information asymmetry between buyers and 
sellers (Deloitte 2017; Levenstein 2015; Pretorius 2016) is 
created by the non-disclosure of the liquidation value, it 
enables the BRP (agent) to obtain the highest possible 
business rescue value for the business, which reduces the 
agency problem.
To summarise, this section discussed several themes in 
relation to valuation in a Goal 2: selling of a business, 
scenario. The main findings included the following:
• The buyer determines the value of the entity. This value is 
usually heavily discounted, and based on the value of 
physical assets, not on the future earnings potential of the 
distressed company. This confirms the findings by 
Roslynn-Smith, De Abreu and Pretorius (2020:40) that 
assets are sold for a value between forced sale value and 
market value during business rescue proceedings.
• The BRP may perform an instinctual valuation for the 
distressed company, using a combination of conventional 
valuation techniques. However, BRPs indicated that this 
instinctual valuation has little relevance.
• Business rescue practitioners used various types of 
bidding processes, with a varying degree of sophistication.
• Liquidation value is independently determined.
The selling of the business as a functioning unit is only one 
way of achieving a BRIL in business rescue. Under Goal 2, 
some BRPs also make use of a controlled wind-down, as 
explained below.
Valuation techniques used to determine the 
business rescue value under Goal 2: Controlled 
wind-down
The second scenario under Goal 2 entails that the BRP sells the 
company’s assets over a specified period and then closes 
the company and business. Table 2 specifies the benefits that 
this type of business rescue has for the creditors, as opposed to 
the selling of assets by a liquidator (under liquidation). The table 
also shows the number of BRPs that mentioned that aspect.
As illustrated in Table 2, the four most notable reasons that a 
BRP can create more value under a controlled wind-down in 
business rescue, as opposed to a liquidator in liquidation 
circumstances, are:
• Cost savings – BRPs are reimbursed on an hourly basis, 
while liquidators ask a prescribed percentage of the value 
of the assets sold. According to one BRP, this would 
mostly be an advantage for companies with for example 
TABLE 2: How the business rescue practitioner creates value through a controlled 
wind-down.
Theme Number of 
occurrences
BRP fees are considerably lower than liquidator’s costs. 8
Business rescue period is much shorter than the liquidation period 
(time value of money consideration). 
5
BRP can sell the assets at market-related sales (e.g. a discount to 
selling price) in business rescue, as opposed to a fire sale 
(e.g. discount to cost price) in liquidation. 
4
The BRP and their team have more capabilities as compared to 
a liquidator (e.g. more efficient in collecting debtors) and can 
institute proper controls while trading.
6
It is possible to limit the creditor base. Business rescue does not 
create further liabilities (e.g. rehabilitation costs in mining and 
milling industries; contingent risks for guarantors in the 
construction industry).
3
The BRP has access to quality information (e.g. consumer buying 
trends) and can plan a detailed closing down strategy with the 
existing management team.
2
The BRP can use seasonal cycles (e.g. sell agricultural products 
before they expire).
2
Assets are preserved and properly maintained and, therefore, 
the assets retain their value.
2
BRP, business rescue practitioner.
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high-value real estate, because it would mean that even 
though the real estate assets are sold for exactly the same 
value in business rescue as in liquidation, the business 
rescue value will exceed the liquidation value because the 
BRP does not get a prescribed percentage of the assets sold:
‘On immovable property he’s [the liquidator] going to take his 
3% plus VAT on the sale of the property, which could be, if 
you’re selling a property for 100 million, well, thank you 
very much, that’s a nice fee – R3 million. That’s a lot of time 
I’m going to have to spend as a practitioner to make that 
kind of fee.’ (BRP10, July 2018, chartered accountant)
• Timing – In business rescue, there are no time constraints 
to pay out business rescue dividends. A liquidator only 
pays dividends once the Master of the High Court has 
approved the distribution account. The acting Chief 
Master, Tessie Bezuidenhout, recently confirmed that 
liquidations in SA take too long. In the USA, simple cases 
are finished within 6 months while, in SA, such cases may 
take 10 years (SARIPA 2018).
• Market-related value – Although the valuation approach 
is still an asset approach, it is the value-in-use of the asset 
sold piecemeal as opposed to the forced sale value. This 
statement is illustrated by the following comment:
‘The value of the stock itself is higher, this jacket for sale at 
the Victoria & Alfred is going to be R5000, stuck in a box, 
being auctioned with 100 other jackets it’s going to be 
50 bucks.’ (BRP5, June 2018, chartered accountant)
• The capabilities of the BRP and their team (discussed in 
more detail below).
A BRP may sometimes pursue Goal 1, but then the creditors 
do not approve the business rescue plan. This situation may 
then result in either a liquidation or a controlled wind-down 
under business rescue. The authors believe that the agency 
problem features very strongly in such an instance since the 
BRP (agent) was appointed by the shareholders or directors 
(principals) with the belief that the BRP would be able to save 
their shareholding, but due to lack of creditor support of the 
plan, the BRP is forced to act against the instruction of the 
principal, and pursue a controlled wind-down. A notable 
finding in relation to maximising the value under a controlled 
wind-down was the capabilities of the BRP. The interviews 
revealed that BRPs have remarkable business acumen (e.g. 
innovation and creative abilities), digital acumen (e.g. data 
analytics) and relational acumen (e.g. communication and 
leadership skills), which enable them to unlock value from a 
financially distressed business. Furthermore, BRPs also find 
themselves in better circumstances than a liquidator. For 
example, BRPs might obtain employee support during the 
business rescue, the Companies Act allows the BRPs a vast 
amount of freedom and the public perception of business 
rescue compared to liquidation is better. Business rescue 
practitioner 9 explained that after working with a company 
for a while, trying to save it, the BRP would have developed 
a relationship with the management and employees, and 
gained access to valuable company data. This puts the BRP in 
a much better situation to extract value from the company 
than a liquidator.
‘I worked with the operational director and the financial director 
for six months trying to rescue it [the group of companies], and 
now I was able to say to them right, we need to change our 
thinking. And because you’ve built up a working relationship, 
you can run that. A liquidator comes in, and he doesn’t even 
know what’s available to him, whereas I was able to say 
shouldn’t we start pairing our discounts, because I’d analysed 
the business. That’s why the wind-down works better in rescue. 
Because as a practitioner, you’ve got to be more imaginative 
than a liquidator. A liquidator opens his toolbox, he sees 
a hammer, and that’s all he’s got, whereas we’ve got the freedom 
to do more because of the Act. Your best employees are 
not going to hang around to work with the liquidator.’ 
(BRP9, July 2018, chartered accountant)
The findings indicated that BRPs have the authority to use 
assets in the ordinary course of business in order to generate 
a profit and can, therefore, utilise seasonal cycles to obtain 
higher asset values. A provisional liquidator has no authority 
to sell assets while the company is under provisional 
liquidation. Assets are disposed of only after the final 
liquidation order at a forced sale value. Many businesses are 
sensitive in relation to seasonal cycles. For these businesses, 
the value of inventory is entirely dependent on the utility it 
may have at a particular time of the year. For example, sales 
in the retail sector usually spike over the festive season in 
December, while in agricultural retail products may expire if 
they are not sold during the harvest seasons. If the BRPs can 
sell assets while it is the high season or close to harvest time, 
it should be possible to sell the assets at a higher value as 
compared to a liquidator who missed the season:
‘You have to be quite smart in how you operate to get a better 
value than liquidation. Otherwise, everybody would do this. We 
closed [number] furniture stores, in three months in Company E. 
We were lucky because it was over November, December, 
January, and our philosophy were on the last day, as you shut 
the store and therefore cut your operating costs, you give away 
the last piece of furniture. So, you start at full retail price, and 
you tweak your discounts because you’re burning, I mean, 
you’re burning [amount] in rent, over that three-month period. 
So, if you’re open for four months, you’re doing worse than that 
[liquidation].’ (BRP 5, June 2018, chartered accountant)
The findings further revealed that in business rescue, as 
opposed to liquidation, it is possible to limit the creditors 
base, which increases the business rescue value. For example, 
in the event of the liquidation of a construction business, all 
construction contracts would be terminated, resulting in the 
crystallisation of the guarantees as liabilities for the company. 
In business rescue, the completion of construction contracts 
and the resulting cancellation of guarantees eliminate the 
risk of these guarantees crystallising as liabilities of the 
financially distressed company, and thus this gives rise to 
higher business rescue dividends. Business rescue 
practitioners were of the opinion that they were able to 
preserve considerable value for creditors in construction 
type businesses by using the ring-fencing of debtors 
technique. This technique results in the construction company 
being left to trade under business rescue. The BRP then 
completes the ring-fenced construction projects by utilising 
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the company’s construction records and its own employees. 
After completion of the construction projects, the BRP collects 
the retention monies from existing construction debtors and 
pays the creditors from the proceeds:
‘We worked out a complete plan where we ring-fenced all the 
debtors, saying we are going to incur legal costs to collect this, 
but in the meanwhile, the business has been relieved of all this 
debt, that’s all you will be paid.’ (BRP1, May 2018, attorney)
Each contract and the expected amounts to be collected from 
the construction debtors are disclosed by the BRP as an 
indication of the business rescue value. Business rescue 
practitioner 1 had even gone as far as to provide a guarantee 
to the creditors, equal to the projected liquidation dividend. 
Thus, the creditors did not take on any risk of losing the 
liquidation dividend if they approved the business rescue 
plan. The excess cash collected in terms of the business rescue 
plan could, therefore, be seen as a top-up or ‘agterskot’ to the 
secured liquidation amount.
In order to use the ring-fence technique, the BRP requires 
operational cash flows to complete construction projects 
and to collect debts from the construction debtors. 
Operational cash flows may come from either the 
construction company’s guarantee provider or an investor 
who buys the company:
‘You might go to your guarantee provider, like Lombard or 
Credit Guarantee and say if I stop, they’re [the clients] going to 
pull the guarantee and you’re just a creditor who is going to get 
nothing, whereas if you help fund it and give the client comfort, 
we will finish it. Your liability goes away because that guarantee 
is not called, the project is finished, and I’ve got some cash in the 
door.’ (BRP9, July 2018, chartered accountant)
To summarise, a Goal 2, controlled wind-down, business 
rescue plan can result in a higher asset value compared to 
liquidation for the following main reasons:
• Market value: The BRP obtained market-related prices 
for the assets as opposed to fire-sale prices in a 
liquidation scenario. The valuation approach followed 
is thus an asset approach, and contrasts the reorganisation 
value which is determined primarily by using the 
income approach of valuation (Altman & Hotchkiss 
2006; Steffen 2016) and ordinary South African business 
practice (PwC 2017).
• Timing: Business rescue dividends can be paid earlier 
than liquidation dividends. This finding was quite 
interesting, because previous literature indicated that 
reorganisation might take several years (Altman & 
Hotchkiss 2006:8, Reilly 2013:13). In SA, therefore, it is 
not only the business rescue value but also the 
liquidation value that should be discounted to account 
for TVM.
• Cost savings: BRP fees are less than liquidator costs, thus 
even though assets might be sold at relatively the same 
market value, the business rescue value will be higher 
than the liquidation value because the cost of realising the 
assets is lower if this is done by a BRP.
• The expertise and capabilities of the BRP can significantly 
increase the asset value realised.
Summary of findings and authors’ 
recommendations
The aim of the study was to determine the valuation 
approaches used by BRPs under a Goal 1 and Goal 2 scenario 
in South African business rescue. The study used constant 
comparative thematic data analysis which allowed the 
researcher to identify significant themes relating to the 
valuation techniques and other valuation-related 
considerations concerning the business rescue value. 
Although the valuation of the debtor as a continuing entity 
and the resulting reorganisation value is at the centre of the 
reorganisation plan in the USA and several other countries 
(Altman & Hotchkiss 2006:33), this study found that it is not 
the case in SA. The business rescue value is determined in a 
different manner from the Chapter 11 reorganisation value. 
The research found that in SA, the goal of business rescue 
affects the valuation approach followed by the BRP. The 
study provided evidence that indicated that under Goal 1, 
return to solvency circumstances, a short-term (3 year), 
undiscounted cash flow budget is prepared by the BRP to 
determine the business rescue value, without the calculation 
of a terminal value, with the voting position of SARS 
influencing the projected cash flows and therefore the 
business rescue value in a significant way. In addition, under 
the Goal 2 business rescue scenarios, the study provided 
evidence that an asset approach is followed to determine the 
business rescue value. The study supports previous research 
by Pretorius (2016) and Pillay et al. (2020) regarding the 
agency problem. Business rescue practitioners might decide 
to sell a company under Goal 2 in order to save a business, 
even if it means that current shareholders will lose ownership. 
However, under Goal 2, BRPs advised that the liquidation 
value should preferably not be disclosed to buyers. Although 
this led to information asymmetry between the buyer and the 
seller, it assists the BRP in obtaining a higher asset value, 
which in return reduces the agency problem.
Figure 3 illustrates and summarises the main valuation 
approaches and valuation considerations used to determine 
the business rescue value in practice.
Finally, Figure 4 provides an overarching summary. Figure 4 
draws from the findings of the approaches used in business 
rescue (as depicted in Figure 3) and juxtaposes the findings 
with the summary of the valuation approaches and main 
valuation techniques generally used for going-concern 
entities (as depicted in Figure 1).
Figure 4 illustrates that the asset valuation approach is 
mainly used in a Goal 2 business rescue valuation, as opposed 
to the relative or income approach, which is most often used 
in going-concern circumstances. Under Goal 1, the BRP uses 
cash flow budgeting techniques to prepare a short-term, 
undiscounted cash flow projection.
After considering the current valuation practice, as indicated 
in Figure 3 and Figure 4, the authors make the following 
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recommendations. Firstly, it is recommended that BRPs 
consider TVM, by discounting both the liquidation value and 
business rescue value using, for example, the current prime 
interest rate plus a risk premium. From a valuation 
perspective, this is theoretically more accurate, and it will 
make a comparison between the business rescue value and 
liquidation value easier and more suitable. Secondly, we 
recommend that under Goal 2: sale of business scenarios, 
BRPs calculate the instinctual valuation with due care, as this 
valuation assists the BRP with the correct decision-making, a 
required competency of the BRP (Pretorius 2014). Thirdly, 
although the findings indicated that BRPs did not calculate 
the value of equity, the authors recommend that BRPs 
calculate the value of equity of at least profitable divisions of 
the business. Given the vital role that PCF plays in the success 
of business rescue (Britz 2018:131; Calitz & Freebody 2016; 
Du Preez 2013; Noomé 2014; Prior 2014:71; Reineck 2015; 
Vanderstraeten 2016:25), a proper equity valuation might 
attract potential investors.
Limitations of the study and 
possible future research
In view of the nature of qualitative research, it was possible 
that the findings made during the study may have been 
affected by the interpretation bias of the authors. This bias 
was, however, minimised by providing thick descriptions of 
participant responses. Another limitation of the study was 
the fact that only BRPs were selected as research participants. 
As indicated in the findings, potential buyers do not usually 
BRIL, better return than immediate liquidation; BRP, business rescue practitioner; SARS, South African Revenue Service.
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disclose their valuation calculations to the BRP. Thus, further 
studies that involve interviews with successful bidders in 
distressed companies may provide a different perspective as 
compared to the findings of this study. Lastly, the business 
rescue industry is prone to a significant lack of formal 
training in the field of turnaround (Pretorius 2014). The 
researcher, however, minimised this limitation to the study 
by carefully and purposefully selecting only participants 
with the appropriate professional background and with 
sufficient experience in turnaround practice.
Various opportunities for further research exist in the field 
of business rescue. Participants mentioned that a business 
rescue plan might show the ‘best valuation’ possible, but 
that understanding why creditors vote either for or against 
a business plan is an aspect that merits further investigation 
from a behavioural finance perspective. Another study 
could also be conducted comparing the actual business 
rescue dividend paid to creditors to the business rescue 
value anticipated in business rescue plans, to ascertain the 
reasonableness of projected business rescue values. Lastly, 
the findings of this study indicated that BRPs made use of 
the asset valuation approach and various types of bidding 
processes. A more granular investigation of the asset 
approach and further analysis of the bidding processes 
might provide a better understanding of the valuation 
phenomena.
Conclusion
By realising the research aim, the study made valuable 
contributions in respect of valuation theory, specifically the 
valuation of a company in business rescue in SA. The 
findings and recommendations made by the authors may 
also provide valuation guidelines to newly qualified BRPs 
and enhance the understanding of the business rescue value 
by shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders who are 
inexperienced in business rescue valuations in SA. It 
appears that the procedures of Chapter 6 of the Companies 
Act are currently a stumbling block in obtaining an optimal 
business rescue value. For example, a business rescue value 
of just above the liquidation value is allowed in terms of 
Chapter 6. Also, specific regulatory responsibilities of 
Chapter 6, such as the publication of the business rescue 
plan within an extremely limited time period together with 
the requirement of no pre-involvement of the BRP with the 
business, are counterproductive in obtaining an optimal 
business rescue value, something that might be reconsidered 
by the legislator.
Acknowledgements
A sincere thank you to each business rescue practitioner who 
participated in this research study.
Competing interests 
The authors declare that they have no financial or personal 
relationships that may have inappropriately influenced them 
in writing this article.
Authors’ contributions
S.C. collected, analysed and interpreted the data, as well as 
drafted the manuscript. C.L. made a substantial contribution 
to the design of the study, critically revised the manuscript 
and edited the final version.
Funding information
This research received no specific grant from any funding 
agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability
The de-identified and summarised data are available, as the 
original data consists of the opinions and beliefs of the 
respondents supplied under an agreement of anonymity.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or 
position of any affiliated agency of the authors.
References
Adriaanse, J.A.A. & Van der Rest, J.P., 2017, Turnaround management and bankruptcy: 
A research companion, Routledge Advances in Management and Business Studies, 
Routledge, New York, NY, viewed 18 January 2019, from http://search.ebscohost.
com.ez.sun.ac.za/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1492119&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.
Akerlof, G.A., 1970, ‘The market for “Lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3), 488–500. https://doi.
org/10.2307/1879431
Altman, E. & Hotchkiss, E., 2006, Corporate financial distress and bankruptcy: Predict 
and avoid bankruptcy, analyse and invest in distressed debt, 3rd edn., Wiley, 
Hoboken, NJ.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 1990, Statement of position 
90-7: Financial reporting by entities in reorganisation under the bankruptcy code, 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York, NY.
Bradstreet, R.S., 2013, ‘Business rescue proves to be creditor-friendly: CJ Claassen J’s 
analysis of the new business rescue procedure in Oakdene Square Properties’, 
South African Law Journal 130(1), 44–52.
Britz, D.C., 2018, ‘Valuing companies under business rescue to attract foreign 
investors’, Doctoral dissertation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
Bryman, A., 2012, Social research methods, 4th edn., Oxford University Press, New 
York, NY.
Buttignon, F., 2015, Distressed firm valuation: Reorganization plan and going-concern 
capital value, viewed 24 November 2019, from https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2567651.
Calitz, J. & Freebody, G., 2016, ‘Is post-commencement finance proving to be the 
thorn in the side of business rescue proceedings under the 2008 Companies Act?’, 
De Jure, 49(2), 265–287.
Conradie, S. & Lamprecht, C., 2018, ‘What are the indicators of a successful business 
rescue in South Africa? Ask the business rescue practitioners’, South African 
Journal of Economic and Management Science 21(1), 1–12. https://doi.
org/10.4102/sajems.v21i1.1726
Correia, C., Flynn, D., Uliana, E., Wormald, M. & Dillon, J., 2015, Financial management, 
8th edn., Juta, Cape Town.
Creswell, J.W. & Plano Clark, P., 2011, Designing and conducting mixed methods 
research, 2nd edn., Sage, Los Angeles, CA.
Crystal, Q.C. & Mokal, R., 2006, The valuation of distressed companies: A conceptual 
framework, viewed 09 June 2019, from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=877155.
Damodaran, A., 2006, The cost of distress: Survival, truncation risk and valuation, 
viewed 30 October 2019, from https://ssrn.com/abstract=887129.
Damodaran, A., 2009, Valuing distressed and declining companies, viewed 
29 November 2017, from http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.
Damodaran, A., 2013, ‘Living with noise: Valuation in the face of uncertainty’, Journal 
of Applied Finance 23(2), 6–22. https://doi.org/10.2469/cp.v30.n4.2
Deloitte, 2017, South Africa restructuring outlook survey results 2017 – Seeing through 
the fog, viewed 26 October 2017, from https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
Deloitte/za/Documents/Corp-Fin/za_Restructuring_Survey_2017.pdf.
Page 13 of 13 Original Research
http://www.sajems.org Open Access
Du Preez, W., 2013, ‘The status of post-commencement finance for business rescue in 
South Africa’, Master’s dissertation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
Gilson, S., Hotchkiss, E. & Ruback, R., 2000, ‘Valuation of bankrupt firms’, The Review 
of Financial Studies 13(1), 43–74. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/13.1.43
Guest, G., Bunce, A. & Johnson, L., 2006, ‘How many interviews are enough? An 
experiment with data saturation and variability’, Field Methods 18(1), 59–82. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X05279903
Harvey, N., 2011, Turnaround management & corporate renewal: A South African 
perspective, Wits University Press, Johannesburg.
Hrdý, M. & Simek, B., 2012, ‘Valuation of the company in financial distress’, E+M 
Ekonomie a Management 15(4), 121–133.
International Valuation Standards Council (IVSC), 2016, IVS 2017 exposure draft, 
International Valuation Standards Council, London.
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H., 1976, ‘The theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, 
agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Economics 3(4), 305–360. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X.
Joubert, E.P. & Loubser, A., 2016, ‘Executive directors in business rescue: Employees 
or something else?’, De Jure Law Journal 49(1), 95–104. https://doi.org/ 
10.17159/2225-7160/2016/v49n1a6
King, N. & Horrocks, C., 2010, Interviews in QUAN research, Sage, London.
Klokow, C., 2018, Business rescue proceedings status report – 2018, Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission, Pretoria.
Lamprecht, C., 2016, ‘A financial reporting framework for South African listed 
companies under business rescue’, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University 
of the Free State.
Levenstein, E., 2015, An appraisal of the New South African business rescue procedure, 
University of Pretoria, Pretoria, viewed 01 March 2020, from http://hdl.handle.
net/2263/56618.
Lincoln, Y.S. & Guba, E.G., 1985, Naturalistic inquiry, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA.
Loubser, A., 2008, ‘The role of shareholders during corporate rescue proceedings: 
Always on the outside looking in’, SA Mercantile Law Journal 20(3), 372–390.
Loubser, A., 2010, ‘The business rescue proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: 
Concerns and questions (part 1)’, Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2010(3), 
501–514.
Loubser, A., 2013, ‘Tilting at windmills? The quest for an effective corporate rescue 
procedure in South African law’, SA Mercantile Law Journal 25(4), 437–457.
Marsden, P. & Laher, L., 2018, [Webcast] 2018 SAICA business rescue breakfast, 
19 April 2018, South Africa.
Migwalla, M., 2017, email, 12 January, tommigwalla@deloitte.co.za
Mkhondo, S. & Pretorius, M., 2017, ‘Pre-packaged applications in business 
reorganisations: International principles’, Southern African Business Review 21(1), 
98–128.
Milne, J. & Oberle, K., 2005, ‘Enhancing rigor in qualitative description’, Journal of 
Wound Ostomy & Continence Nursing 32(6), 413–420. https://doi.org/ 10.1097/ 
00152192-200511000-00014
Noomé, J., 2014, ‘The sources and obstacles of post-commencement finance in South 
Africa: A comparison with the United Kingdom and Australia’, Master’s 
dissertation, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg.
Oxford, 2017, Benefit, viewed 26 February 2017, from https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/benefit.
Pillay, S., Rajaram, R. & Ramnanun, K., 2020, ‘Ascertaining the impact of post-
commencement finance on business rescue in Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa’, The 
Journal of Social Sciences Research 6(3), 236–244. https://doi.org/10.32861/
jssr.63.236.244
Poniachek, H., 2010, ‘Valuation of distressed companies and securities’, Valuation 
Strategies 14(2), 22–27.
Pretorius, M., 2014, ‘A competency framework for the business rescue practitioner 
profession’, Acta Commercii 14(2), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.4102/ac.v14i2.227
Pretorius, M., 2016, ‘The debtor-friendly fallacy in business rescue: Agency theory 
moderation and quasi relationships’, South African Journal of Economic and 
Management Sciences 19(4), 479–496. https://doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v19i4.1385
Prior, V., 2014, ‘A pre-assessment checklist to filing for business rescue in South 
Africa’, Master’s dissertation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
PwC, 2017, Closing the value gap: Valuation methodology survey 2016/2017, viewed 
22 November 2017, from https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/closing-the-
value-gap-2016-2017.pdf.
Rajak, H. & Henning, J., 1999, ‘Business rescue for South Africa’, South African Law 
Journal 116(1), 262–287.
Rajaram, R., Singh, A.M. & Sewpersadh, N.S., 2018, ‘Business rescue: Adapt or 
die’, South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 21(1), 1–13. 
https://doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v21i1.2164
Reilly, R., 2013, ‘Construction industry bankruptcy valuations issues’, Construction 
Accounting & Taxation 23(4), 5–17.
Reineck, J.P., 2015, ‘A private equity structure to facilitate the effective post 
commencement financing of business rescue’, Master’s dissertation, University of 
Cape Town, Cape Town.
Republic of South Africa (RSA), 2008, Companies Act, no 71 of 2008, Government 
Printer, Pretoria.
Republic of South Africa (RSA), 2008, Companies Act, Government Printer, Pretoria.
Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C.M. & Ormston, R., 2013, QUAL research practice: 
A guide for social science students and researchers, Sage, London.
Rosslyn-Smith, W., De Abreu, N.V.A. & Pretorius, M., 2020, ‘Exploring the indirect costs 
of a firm in business rescue’, South African Journal of Accounting Research 34(1), 
24–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/10291954.2019.1667647
Rowley, J., 2012, ‘Conducting research interviews’, Management Research Review 
35(3/4), 260–271. https://doi.org/10.1108/01409171211210154
SARIPA, 2018, Western Cape regional seminar, SARIPA, Cape Town, 14 June 2018.
Shenton, A.K., 2004, ‘Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in QUAL research projects’, 
Education for Information 22(2), 63–75. https://doi.org/10.3233/EFI-2004-22201
Steffen, B.J., 2016, ‘Reorganization value: What it is ... and isn’t’, Association of 
Insolvency & Restructuring Advisors Journal 30(3), 1–27.
Stone, G., 2015, ‘Power, dependence and frustration: A study of power in Australian 
accountants’ advisory relationship with small business’, Meditari Accountancy 
Research 23(3), 250–275. https://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-05-2014-0042
TMA-SA, 2016, CRA Course material, Turnaround Management Association, 
Johannesburg
TMA-US, 2016, Body of knowledge: Accounting and finance, Turnaround Management 
Association, Chicago.
Van der Straeten, M., 2016, ‘Business rescue: Feature’, Without Prejudice 16(7), 1–34.
Werksmans, 2012, No preferential creditor status for SARS in a business rescue, viewed 
20 January 2021, from https://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2018/ 
10/155_JN5392Werksmans-Brief_December-2012_SARSinaBusinessRescue.pdf.
